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Allocation of Internally Generated Corporate Cash flow in Africa 
 
Abstract 
We examine how managers of African firms, operating in environments characterised by less developed 
capital markets and weak institutional structures, make use of their internally generated cash flows. We 
find that managers of African firms hold most of their internally generated cash flows, and when they 
decide to spend, they allocate a higher proportion towards dividend payments; followed by leverage 
adjustments; then to investments; and lastly, to equity repurchases. These allocations are consistent with 
the existence of a significant financial constraint in African markets, and the use of dividends to signal 
credit quality in relatively underdeveloped capital markets. 
 
  
Keywords: Financial constraints, cash flow, cash holdings, investments, dividend, Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The efficient allocation of internally generated cash flows (cash flows, henceforth) is one of the 
vital roles of corporate managers, especially when firms are likely to face external financing constraints. 
Managers can choose to spend corporate cash flows on new investments, pay dividends, reduce or 
increase existing debt or equity stocks, or buffer cash reserves to hedge against future capital shortfalls 
(Chang et al., 2014). Since there are benefits and costs associated with each of the cash flow uses, 
allocations of cash flows have implications on the viability of firms, especially those operating in 
underdeveloped African capital markets. Most African economies are characterised by limited access 
of firms to external capital and weak institutional infrastructure (e.g. legal systems, political/corporate 
governance structures, etc.) (see Misati and Nyamongo, 2011; Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2014). Moreover, 
economic uncertainty regarding the frequent policy changes and reversals coupled with political 
instability in most African countries imply greater operational/business risk (Biggs and Shah, 2006), 
which may translate into weaker future operating profits/cash flow (Collier and Gunning, 1999) and 
further worsen the financing problems faced by African firms.   
Against this background, we posit that managers of African ﬁrms would prefer to save current cash 
flows rather than spend since cash holdings have a higher premium under conditions characterised by 
financing constraints (see Olper et al., 1999; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Archarya et al., 2012). In 
other words, the fear of not being able to access external financing easily and/or raise sufficient internal 
funds in the future should make the current internally generated cash flows an extremely valuable 
organisational resource for African firms, and lead them to hoard current cash as a hedging tool against 
future shortfalls in external (or even internal) financing. We ﬁnd results that are consistent with this 
prediction. Specifically, managers of African firms save a higher proportion of their internally generated 
cash ﬂows, and when they decide to spend, they tend to prioritise dividend payments over investment, 
debt repayments, and equity repurchases. This high allocation to cash holdings is consistent with the 
need to buffer current cash reserves as a hedge against future cash shortfalls, which may be difﬁcult to 
cover in relatively underdeveloped capital markets. 
The high allocation to dividend payments, ahead of capital expenditure suggests a high desire by 
firms in emerging markets to signal their quality to alleviate the high information asymmetry problems 
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(Fosu, 2014).1 Also, by choosing to save and/or pay dividends, managers of African ﬁrms seem to 
exhibit a high level of risk aversion and a propensity to under-invest. These results are robust to 
controlling for the dynamic nature of corporate decisions, and factors that may affect cash ﬂow 
allocations (e.g. growth opportunities, ﬁrm size, asset tangibility, debt levels, and current cash 
holdings). 
Our study is important for at least four related reasons. First, we add to our understanding of how 
managers of African ﬁrms allocate cash ﬂows among competing needs (i.e. cash holdings, dividend 
payments, investments in capital expenditure, and debt or equity repayments/issuance). Thus, we throw 
some light on corporate or managerial choices in environments of underdeveloped capital markets and 
weak institutional infrastructure. Second, since our analysis of cash flow uses includes investments, we 
contribute to the existing literature on investment-cash-ﬂow-sensitivity (ICFS, hereafter) which has 
mostly focused on firms in advanced economies (notably, the US). Whether the conclusions drawn from 
firms in the advanced countries hold for other firms in developing economies remains an open empirical 
question, to which we seek to address. Speciﬁcally, to the best of our knowledge and based on our 
extensive search of the literature, this article is the first to provide insights on cash flow sensitivities 
based exclusively on firms from African economies.2 Third, we provide a more extensive analysis of 
how firms spend their incremental cash flows by focusing on all uses of cash rather than the piecemeal 
approach in the literature. In particular, our analysis shows that beyond investments in capital 
expenditure, the other cash ﬂows uses (i.e. cash holdings, dividend payments, and adjustments in debt 
and equity capital) which have been largely overlooked in the literature are important for understanding 
the effects of ﬁnancial constraints on corporate decisions. Finally, there is very little theoretical 
guidance on how the degree of financial constraints may influence the allocation of cash flows. For 
instance, it is unclear whether a financially constrained firm should invest more or less or pay more or 
less dividends. In this regard, our early empirical evidence on the cash flow allocations of African firms 
could be a step in the right direction in informing theory development in this area. 
Our results have important implications for economic policy and corporate practice. Since the use 
of cash typically affects economic growth and development, our finding of high cash hoarding by firms 
should prove worrisome to policymakers in African countries who are keen to accelerate economic 
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growth and development and to help them formulate or reform their economic policies to get firms to 
invest more in long-term capital projects. Another key implication of our results is that the adverse 
external operating environment of firms may influence managerial risk appetite by making corporate 
managers commit liquid resources to “low-risk low-return” courses such as cash holdings and dividend 
payments.      
Next, we review the literature that helps to set the scene for our empirical analysis. Then, we 
describe the empirical methodology and the data utilised in the paper, followed by a discussion of the 
results as well as some robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related literature  
2.1 Corporate cash flows and financing constraint 
Extant research into firms’ financing decisions suggests that the presence of frictions such as 
information asymmetry, agency problems, uncertainties, among others, makes the source and type of 
finance that managers choose matter for firm value (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Myers and Majluf, 
1984; Agyei-Boapeah, 2015). More broadly, firms can raise funds internally (via operating cash flow) 
or externally (through debt or equity issuance), and the capital market frictions (e.g. information 
asymmetry) lead to some additional costs (direct and indirect). This makes external capital relatively 
expensive especially for firms that face significant financial constraints (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Brav, 
2009).  
One of such costs associated with external finance is the upfront (direct) transaction costs incurred 
by firms when raising equity or debt capital from capital markets or financial institutions. For their 
sample of US firms during 1990-1994, Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996) report that the average 
direct costs of equity issuance ranges from 7% to 11% of the proceeds, while the direct costs of debt 
are relatively lower, around 2-4%. They further report that the transaction costs of raising new equity 
and debt capital is substantially higher in their sub-sample of financially constrained firms. For example, 
when they utilise credit rating to partition their sample into financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms, they report the direct costs of raising straight bonds to be only 0.9% for unconstrained firms, 
compared to 3.4% for their constrained counterparts. Thus, firms that are likely to be financially 
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constrained may need to actively look for competitive alternatives to external finance if they need to be 
able to support their operations and future investments.  
Related literature elsewhere focusing on corporate liquidity (e.g. Opler et al., 1999; Almeida et al., 
2004; Faulkender and Wang, 2006) suggest that internally generated cash flows, being an alternative to 
external finance, are important for firms, especially those that are likely to face significant financial 
constraints. Corporate cash flows enable firms to service contractual debt payments and therefore 
reduce the risk of financial distress, as well as offer firms the ability to undertake investments without 
having to access external capital markets, and to thereby avoid both transaction (direct) costs and 
information asymmetry (indirect) costs on debt and equity issues.  
Empirically, Fazarri, Hubbard, and Petersen (1998) provide early evidence of a positive relationship 
between internally generated cash flow and investment. They further find this relationship to be more 
pronounced for firms that are most likely to have difficulty accessing the external capital market. The 
authors conclude that there is a significant difference between the costs of internal and external 
financing and that capital market frictions may cause financially constrained firms to forgo some 
positive NPV projects. Other studies including Boyle and Guthrie (2003) and Pawlina and Renneboog 
(2005) support the original findings of Fazarri et al. (1988), while others (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales, 
1997; and Chen and Chen, 2012) find inconsistent results. It is noteworthy that all these studies have 
been conducted in the context of advanced economies, notably the US, and have therefore relied on 
imperfect proxies in gauging firms’ levels of financial constraint. Thus, the analysis of African firms in 
the present study offers a useful addition to this literature by exploring the issue of investment-cash-
flow-sensitivity within the African context where external financing constraints may be more prevalent. 
Similarly and with respect to cash holdings, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) examine the 
cash flow sensitivity of cash, based on the idea that firms with investment opportunities but have limited 
or no access to external capital markets (constrained firms) will save cash out of their current cash flows 
when they anticipate the need for resources for future investments. In contrast, unconstrained firms will 
not engage in such liquidity management since they can easily obtain external finance when the need 
arises. Using US and G-7 countries, Almeida et al. (2004) and subsequently Khurana, Martin, and 
Pereira (2006) show that financially constrained firms exhibit a positive sensitivity of cash flow to cash, 
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while unconstrained firms exhibit no such systematic sensitivity. More recently, Tsoukalas, Tsoukas, 
and Guariglia (2017) propose a framework which incorporates investment regimes (low vs. high) into 
Almeida et al.’s (2004) model. They argue and provide evidence to suggest that firms that face costly 
external finance use cash to transfer resources from periods of low (or no) investments to periods of 
high investments. Put differently, firms accumulate cash (save) during inaction periods and use the 
previously accumulated cash during investment spikes. They conclude that firms’ cash policy follow a 
step-like function (i.e. high-low-high-low). 
Empirical studies of corporate cash holdings (e.g. Olper et al., 1999; Harford, 1999; Almeida et al., 
2004) find that firms with better growth opportunities, riskier cash flows, and limited access to capital 
markets hold higher cash balances. This suggests that constrained firms with growth prospects are more 
reliant on internal funds and therefore hold higher levels of cash than do firms that can easily access 
more funds externally when they need it. Faulkender and Wang (2006) go beyond the determinants of 
corporate cash holdings to consider the value that the market places on cash holdings. They argue that 
for firms that face greater financing constraints, the marginal value of cash should be higher than for 
firms that can easily raise additional capital. An additional internally generated cash flow enables a 
constrained firm to avoid the higher costs of raising external funds, thereby rendering additional internal 
funds relatively more valuable. Based on their predominantly US sample over the period 1971-2001 
and employing access to public debt markets as a proxy for financial constraints, they find that the 
estimated marginal values of $1 cash generated are $1.15 and $0.73 for financially constrained firms 
and unconstrained firms, respectively. These results demonstrate that the market perceives difficulty in 
accessing capital markets to be costly, and therefore, reward constrained firms with higher valuations 
for holding cash that helps them to mitigate potential underinvestment. 
Collectively, the existing literature on corporate cash flows suggests that the presence of substantial 
transaction costs of raising external finance makes internally generated cash flows a critical resource 
for firms that are likely to face significant external financing constraints. If indeed, most African firms 
operate in environments where it is more difficult to access capital markets, then operating cash flow 
becomes a valuable asset of African firms and how managers deploy cash flow becomes essential for 
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firm value as well as economic growth. These considerations, among others, make the cash flow 
allocations of African firms a matter worthy of a careful inquiry.     
 
2.2 The African environment 
Prior studies have persuasively established that the ability of firms to raise external finance is 
strongly influenced by the economic, financial, and legal environment in which it operates (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998; La Porta et al., 1997). Accordingly, the enforcement of contracts, the quality of 
governance, and the level of financial market development affect the cost of external capital faced by 
firms. Legal systems with ineffective contract enforcement and higher agency (moral hazard) problems 
make it more challenging to obtain long-term finance (La Porta et al., 1997). Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
argue that well developed financial markets and institutions help firms to overcome moral hazards and 
adverse selection (information asymmetry) problems, thereby reducing the costs of raising external 
finance for firms. By contrast, these problems are exacerbated in countries with underdeveloped 
financial markets and weaker institutions that protect investors’ interests, thereby raising the costs of 
external funds for firms in such economies.     
Most developing countries, particularly those across the African continent, share some features that 
reduce shareholder rights and expose them to severe agency problems (Agyei-Boapeah, 2015; Gyapong, 
Monen, and Hu, 2016).  First, inadequate corporate information disclosures and the absence of well-
functioning public credit information sharing systems in many African economies (Fosu, 2014), 
exacerbate the information asymmetry problems in financial markets and make it more difficult for 
firms to access external finance at reasonable costs. Second, financial and insurance markets in most 
African economies are in their nascent stages (Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2014), rending them relatively 
underdeveloped, and thereby limiting access to external capital on the continent (Ntim and Tunyi, 
2016). Third, the legal and judicial systems in the region are plagued by obsolete laws and bureaucratic 
procedures, insufficient resources, and corruption (Biggs and Shah, 2006), that results in public 
perception of a legal and judicial system that is unworkable, too costly, and slow for resolving 
commercial disputes. Finally, the economies of most African countries are prone to shocks – periodic 
weather-related distress in agriculture, civil conflicts, terms-of-trade shocks, frequent policy changes, 
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infrastructure breakdowns, among others (see Collier and Gunning, 1999). These shocks to the 
economic system tend to cause unanticipated changes in prices and transaction costs, resulting in 
unexpected changes in firms’ cash flows. In such shock-prone circumstances, firms find it difficult to 
raise external finance, leading to significant financial constraints for most African firms. 
Although there are studies that address the effect of these economic and institutional challenges on 
the economic growth and development of African countries (e.g. Collier and Gunning, 1999), empirical 
research on the effect of these challenges faced by African economies on access to external capital 
remains mostly unexplored. A notable exception is a study by Gwatidzo and Ojah (2014) based on a 
survey of firms in 11 African countries conducted between 2002 and2006. They find that variables for 
economic/political stability and the quality of the legal systems across African countries are statistically 
and positively related to firms’ access to debt financing. They conclude that economic/political 
instability and the poor legal environment in which most African firms operate impede their ability to 
access external finance.  
Overall, the foregoing discussions appear to support our argument that since most African firms 
operate in environments of significant external financing constraints, they will immensely value their 
internally generated operating cash flows in order not to forgo potentially profitable projects. Therefore, 
we examine how African firms allocate their internally generated cash flows across the competing uses. 
Our study relates to the recent research by Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) and Chang et al. (2014) 
and Lewellen and Lewellen (2016) who examine cash flow spending by firms in advanced economies 
(mostly the US) on investments, financing, and distributions to shareholders (e.g. dividend payments 
and share repurchases). For example, Gatchev et al. (2010) report that financing-cash flow sensitivities 
dominate investment cash flow sensitivities. When cash flow increases by $1, leverage declines by 
$0.76, while investments increase by only $0.16. They conclude that firms respond to lower (higher) 
cash flows primarily by increasing (paying down) debt. The question we ask in this article is whether 
African firm also allocate their cash flows in this manner, given the institutional environment they find 
themselves.   
 
3. Data and methods 
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3.1 Estimation methods 
Drawing from the cash flow identity methodological argument (see Chang et al., 2014), we utilise 
an integrated regression framework in which all the identified cash flow uses are interrelated by the 
identity that the sum of all cash flow uses must equal the value of cash flow itself. This cash flow 
identity, in theory, implies that the sum of the cash flow sensitivities of all the uses (if the list is 
exhaustive) must equal unity. That is, if cash flow increases by a currency unit (say, $1.00), the 
incremental allocation to all the cash flow uses must also sum to a currency unit (i.e. $1.00). 
Our baseline empirical models [speciﬁed below in Eq. (1)] regress the major uses of cash flow (i.e. 
cash holdings, dividends, capital expenditure, change in debt, and change in equity) on cash ﬂow and a 
set of control variables. Together, these items (cash holdings, dividends, capital expenditure, change in 
debt, and change in equity) provide a nearly complete picture of how firms spend cash flow.3  
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where Yit is a vector of cash ﬂow uses (i.e. cash holding, dividends, investment in capital expenditure, 
and changes in debt and equity) for ﬁrm i at time t; α is the constant; φ and β are vectors of parameters 
to be estimated; CFit is the cash ﬂow; Xit−1 is a vector of lagged control variables (explained below); ηi 
represents time-invariant unobservable ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects; ηt represents time-speciﬁc effects; and it
it is an error term. Guided by work in the cash holding and capital structure literature (e.g. Agyei-
Boapeah, 2015), the control variables (deﬁned in Appendix A) include market-to-book ratio, asset 
tangibility, ﬁrm size, leverage, and cash balance.  
It is important to highlight that the parameter estimates (φ) for the cash ﬂow variable (CFit) in Eq. 
(1) represent the sensitivity of a particular use of cash to internally generated cash ﬂow. Thus, φ is 
interpreted in the present article as the proportion of current cash ﬂow allocated to a speciﬁc use, and it 
is the magnitude as well as the statistical signiﬁcance of this parameter (φ) that are of primary interest 
to us. We further control for country-, industry-, and time-specific effects by the use of dummies, but 
these are unreported in the results to conserve space.  
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We estimate Eq. (1) using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to enable us compare 
our findings with prior studies. Moreover, OLS estimation helps us to preserve our sample size since 
instruments are required to warrant imposing additional restrictions on our data.4 However, OLS 
estimation may result in biased and/or inconsistent parameter estimates due to its inability to deal with 
endogeneity problems relating to omitted variables and measurement errors. We, therefore, test the 
robustness of our findings to these econometric challenges by applying a system Generalised Method 
of Moments (sys-GMM) estimation technique on a relatively smaller (reduced) sample.   
The sys-GMM is designed to minimize these econometric concerns (Chang et al., 2014; Amit, 
2015) by accommodating the fact that most corporate decisions (e.g. investment and capital structure) 
are not static but follow a partial adjustment towards equilibrium (Fosu, 2014). Thus, it includes a 
lagged dependent variable to controls for persistence and thereby minimizes endogeneity problems 
resulting from omitted variables (Amit, 2015). However, the lagged dependent variables are, by 
construction, correlated with the differenced error term.  
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose the difference GMM estimator, which uses the lagged levels of 
the endogenous variables as instruments, to circumvent this problem. As shown in Blundell and Bond 
(1998), lagged levels of the explanatory variables can perform poorly in the first-differences equation, 
possibly due to persistence or measurement errors. Therefore, to improve efficiency, the equation in 
levels may be combined with the differenced equation to form a system of equations (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). In the system GMM, the variables in levels have as instruments the lagged first-difference 
of the corresponding variables. To deal with the problem of excessive instruments that arises when 
sample size increases, we restrict our instruments for the system GMM from the second to the fifth lag. 
Further, when instruments are valid, Chang et al. (2014) and Lewellen and Lewellen (2016) note that 
system GMM can employ higher order moments to deal with measurement error problems.  
 
3.2 Data and descriptives 
We begin our data collection by retrieving a list of all ﬁrms from the 15 African countries 
(Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) available on Datastream Worldscope Database 
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from 1980-2015. There were 4,723 unique ﬁrms (5,503 firm-years) identified over the period. 
Following standard procedures in the literature, we drop 1,971 financial and utility firms (see 
Faulkender and Wang 2006; Gatchev et al., 2010),5 and 2,022 firms with missing data for the 
construction of key variables. The final sample for our OLS analysis is drastically reduced to 730 unique 
ﬁrms (i.e. 5,503 ﬁrm-year observations) from 13 African countries (see Table 1) over the period 2000-
2015. As stated earlier, when utilising the system GMM for robustness testing, we further restrict the 
sample to those with 5 consecutive years of data, thus, losing an additional 325 firms, ending up with 
405 unique firms (3,682 firm-years) from 5 African countries. This filter is imposed to help us generate 
the required set of instruments to implement the system-GMM regressions.6 Finally, all the variables 
are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% to reduce the effect of outliers while conserving the sample 
size.  
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the study’s variables for the full sample (Panel A) and 
by country and years in Panels B and C, respectively. Firms in our sample generate (on average) 18.3% 
of assets in cash ﬂows, and allocate them as follows: 1.4% of assets to cash holdings, 5.4% of assets to 
dividend payments, 8.3% of assets to capital expenditure (investments), 1.9% of assets to increase 
leverage, and 0.3% of assets to equity issues. Comparing the statistic on equity issues of African firms 
(0.3%) to that reported in Gatchev et al. (2010) for US firms (5.1%) suggests that raising external capital 
in the form of equity may be a rarity in Africa. The high cash ﬂow allocations to investments and 
dividend payments by African firms seem consistent with our expectations of corporate behaviour in 
under-developed ﬁnancial markets with high external ﬁnancial constraints. The low allocation to buffer 
cash holdings is, however, surprising. It is important to note that these are descriptive statistics and do 
not control for some important determinants of the various uses of cash.  
In terms our control variables, the average ﬁrm has market-to-book ratio of 1.8, size of 15.3, debt 
ratio of 15.5%, asset tangibility of 35.6%, and cash balance of 12.5% of the total asset. The statistic on 
cash balance suggests that African ﬁrms exhibit a higher propensity to save as they keep larger cash 
balances of 12.5%. This compares to 8.0% held by top US ﬁrms (see Harford, 1999), 7% and 9.1% cash 
kept by firms in Czech Republic and Belgium respectively (see Tsoukalas, Tsoukas, and Guariglia, 
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2017). In Panel B, internally generated cash flow is particularly high in Tanzania (28.4%) and Malawi 
(24.8%) and low in Uganda (14%) and Tunisia (15.6%). Further, time series statistics in Panel C show 
that cash flow generated by African firms was around 20% for most of the early years until 2009 when 
it plummeted to around 17%. This suggests that the recent global financial crisis of 2007-2010 may 
have adversely impacted corporate cash flow generation on the African continent. We later (in Section 
5) examine whether the crisis did change the cash flow allocation patterns of African firms. 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix, with most coefﬁcients having the expected signs. Cash ﬂow 
(the key variable of interest) is positively correlated with cash holdings, dividends, investments, changes 
in debt and equity, growth opportunities, firm size, and asset tangibility; but negatively correlated with 
debt levels. Finally, the correlation among the variables is generally low (with highest correlation 
coefficient being 0.59), suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to pose any serious problems to our 
regression analysis. 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
4. Results and discussions 
The results estimated using OLS and system-GMM are presented in Table 3. As can be seen, the 
coefﬁcients for the cash ﬂow variable (CFit), representing estimates of the proportion of cash ﬂows 
allocated towards a particular use, are signiﬁcant at conventional levels across all models. This implies 
that operating cash ﬂows have a signiﬁcant impact on important corporate decisions regarding cash 
holdings, dividend payments, new investments, and changes in debt and equity capital. 
We first discuss the OLS results and compare them with the prior related studies conducted in the 
US setting. The OLS results in Table 3 suggest that the average African firm allocates its yearly 
operating cash flows as follows: saves 28.5%, and spends 16.7% on dividends, 14.6% on leverage 
adjustments, 13.9% on capital expenditure, and 0.8% on equity repurchases. The results imply that the 
top (bottom) two priorities of corporate managers of African firms regarding cash usage are cash 
holding and dividend payments (share repurchases and capital expenditure). By way of comparison 
with the OLS findings in Lewellen and Lewellen (2016), US firms spend their cash flows in this order: 
26% on capital expenditure, 15% on cash holdings, 13% on debt reduction, 13% on share repurchases, 
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and only 6% on dividends. Similarly, Chang et al. (2014) report that American firms allocate cash flow 
in the following manner: 33% cash holding, 29% debt repayment, 26% investment, 10% share 
repurchases, and 1% dividend. Thus, US firms seem to prioritise capital expenditure, cash holdings, 
and debt repayments when allocating cash flow. The striking difference in the cash allocation patterns 
of African and American firms seems to bother on dividend payment. While African firms appear to 
rank dividend payment highly, distributions to shareholders through dividends seem to be a less priority 
in the US.            
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
As can be seen from Table 3, the results estimated using system-GMM, which are robust to 
endogeneity and measurement error concerns, are similar to those of the OLS, following the same 
pattern of cash allocation. The sys-GMM estimations show that for each unit of additional cash ﬂow 
generated in a year, managers of African firms save 27.8% of it, spend 18.8% on dividends, use 11.7% 
to change their leverage, spend only 8.9% on investments in capital expenditure, and lastly, spend 1.3% 
on equity repurchases. Comparatively, sys-GMM results in Chang et al.’s (2014) US study shows the 
following order of cash allocation: investments (25%), debt repayment (24%), savings (20%), equity 
repurchases (11%), and dividends (1%).  
The relatively higher (lower) cash allocations by African firms to cash holdings and dividend 
payments (share repurchases) seem consistent with the existence of ﬁnancial constraints and the 
ﬁndings in Acharya et al. (2012) who report high cash holdings for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms in the 
US. This high savings from current cash ﬂows suggests a high desire by African firms to hedge against 
future ﬁnancing shortfalls, which may be extremely difﬁcult to cover in under-developed  capital 
markets with a higher degree of information asymmetry.  
Meanwhile, the high cash ﬂow allocations to dividend payments may suggest that managers of 
African ﬁrms use dividends in an attempt to signal their credit quality to investors in an African 
environment characterised by high information asymmetry (Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2014). Ravid and Sarig 
(1991) posit that dividends are a signal of credit quality to investors in the presence of signiﬁcant 
information asymmetry. Fama and French (2001) empirically show that larger ﬁrms with better 
operating proﬁtability have higher propensity to pay dividends, which then makes dividends a 
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potentially credible tool to signal firm quality in the presence of information asymmetry. Although 
higher personal tax rate on dividend income may serve as a disincentive for ﬁrms paying out dividends 
to their shareholders (Bagwell and Shoven, 1989), this seems not to be the case for African firms. 
Perhaps, the weak legal structures coupled with high corruption in most African countries (Gwatidzo 
and Ojah, 2014) weaken enforcement of African tax laws, and therefore, managers of African firms are 
emboldened to pay out higher dividends to shareholders.  
However, our finding of relatively lower cash flow allocations to investments (capital expenditure) 
seems surprising. The theory underlying the investment-cash-flow-sensitivity (ICFS) literature suggests 
that firms that are likely to face external financial constraints should have a higher propensity to fund 
their investments from their internal cash flow (Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). 
Applying OLS regressions on a sample of US manufacturing ﬁrms from 1970-1984, Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) report that firms spend between 20% and 70% of their cash flows on investments. 
Similarly, OLS results in Lewellen and Lewellen (2016) and sys-GMM results in Chang et al. (2014) 
estimate investment-cash flow sensitivity for US firms to be around 25%. Taken together, US ﬁrms 
seem to spend between 20% and 70% of incremental cash ﬂow on investments. Given the difﬁculty for 
African ﬁrms to access external ﬁnance, we expected them to allocate higher proportions of their cash 
ﬂows to investments. However, our African results surprisingly show a substantially lower sensitivity 
of cash flows to investments (OLS estimate of 8.7% and a system-GMM estimate of 8.1%).  
Our surprising results for African firms, believed to be operating in environments of greater 
financial constraints, may be explained by the view that investment-cash flow sensitivity may not be a 
good proxy for the presence of financial constraints (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Chen and Chen, 2012). 
Our finding of lower ICFS for African firms may also imply that African firms are saddled with 
underinvestment problems. Our results, so far, suggest that managers of African ﬁrms may exhibit risk-
aversion when we consider their high cash flow allocations to cash holdings and dividend payments 
(the two top priorities) to be “low-risk low-return” projects relative to investments in long-term capital 
expenditures. 
Finally, the low cash flow allocations to debt and equity issues/retirement suggest that African ﬁrms 
may be less active in using internally generated cash ﬂows to adjust their capital structure. This may be 
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due to the relatively illiquid bonds and stock markets in Africa, which makes it difﬁcult for ﬁrms to 
easily retire and re-issue securities. Turning attention to the control variables, the proxy for growth 
opportunities (market-to-book ratio) is signiﬁcant and positive across most models, except the cash 
holding model which shows a negative association. This implies that ﬁrms with higher growth 
opportunities hold less cash, pay more dividends, borrow more, and issue more equity. Firm size and 
asset tangibility were mostly insigniﬁcant in several models. The leverage ratio (TDA) is mostly 
negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that ﬁrms with existing high debt burden are associated with 
holding less cash, paying fewer dividends, and making less borrowing. The cash balance is mostly 
signiﬁcant, positive in some models and negative in other models.  
Lastly, the diagnostic statistics of the models are satisfactory. The OLS models have adjusted R-
square scores of between 5% and 51%, and the F-statistics are signiﬁcant indicating that the regressors 
provide a better ﬁt of the models. The m-square and J-statistic in the GMM models also indicate that 
there are no concerns with second-order auto-correlation and that the instruments used are valid, 
respectively. 
 
5. Robustness testing and further analysis 
In this section, we conduct some further analysis to ascertain the robustness of our results to 
alternative specifications. In the interest of brevity, we only present OLS results here. As in the previous 
analysis, the sys-GMM results were qualitatively similar. First, since external financing constraints are 
more binding on firms during economic recessions and financial crises, we test to see whether our 
African firms, argued in this paper to be operating in financial constraint environment, maintained their 
cash flow spending ranking during the recent global financial crisis of 2007-2009. We conduct this test 
by re-running the baseline model separately for our sub-samples covering the financial crisis period 
(2007-2009) and the other (non-financial crisis) sample period. As shown in Table 4, the ranking of 
cash flow spending remained the same across both crisis and non-crisis periods. Specifically, the cash 
flow spending ranking in both periods followed the previously reported pattern of savings, dividends, 
debt adjustments, capital expenditure, and equity repurchases. This implies that the recent global 
financial crisis did not affect the patterns of cash flow spending among African firms. 
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Second, we follow Chang et al. (2014) to decompose our cash flow into a trend (permanent) and 
cycle (transitory) components to test whether measurement errors in market-to-book ratio, our proxy 
for firms’ growth prospects, could influence our results. Since cycle measures contain little information 
about the future beyond short-term momentum (Chang et al., 2014), they provide results that are less 
likely to be contaminated by future growth prospects. The final set of results in Table 4 shows that any 
potential failure of market-to-book ratio to properly control for firms’ growth opportunities did not 
qualitatively influence our results. The spending rankings of cash holdings, dividends, investments, and 
so on, remain unchanged. 
Third, in the first set of analysis in Table 5, we test whether our findings are unduly driven by South 
African firms given that they are in the majority. The conclusion of large allocations to savings and 
dividends holds in both subsamples (South Africa vs. Others), except that dividend is ranked third in 
the non-South African sample instead of the second position it usually occupies in other reported results. 
Nonetheless, relative to the prior US studies often ranking dividend at the bottom (fifth), the non-South 
African firms still seem to prioritise dividend payment.  
Fourth, we conduct further analysis (in Panel A of Table 5) with a relatively large sample larger 
sample which includes financial and utility firms, and the conclusions regarding the order of cash flow 
allocations remain unchanged. Fifth, in Panel B of Table 5, we test whether external financial constraint 
may influence cash flow allocation. Following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015) and Gopalan et al. 
(2012), we use asset tangibility, asset liquidity, and Wu & Whited (WW) index as our proxy for 
financial constraint. As can be seen, the results are mixed with no explicit ordering of cash allocation 
across the three proxies. However, cash holding and dividend payments seem to be a top priority for 
most African firms (constrained and unconstrained), suggesting that the high allocations to dividend 
may not necessarily be due to the presence of significant financial constraints in African markets. 
Perhaps, other explanations from the perspectives of risk-aversion of managers and the lack of 
investment opportunities may better explain this phenomenon. Future studies may consider this issue 
further.        
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Furthermore, in untabulated results, we follow Lewellen and Lewellen (2016) and Chang et al. 
(2014) to use higher moments in GMM (GMM3, GMM4, and GMM5) to further address the 
measurement error problem. The results again did not qualitatively change our conclusions. Finally, we 
conduct analysis based on the baseline specifications often used in the investment-cash-flow sensitivity 
literature, where investment (use of cash) is regressed on cash flow and market-to-book ratio only. 
Therefore, in conducting this final analysis, we drop all the regressors in our baseline model in Eq. (1) 
except cash flow and market-to-book ratio. The results (untabulated) suggest that our findings are robust 
to alternative specifications.            
 
6. Conclusions 
We examine cash ﬂow allocations for ﬁrms operating in Africa, a market where firms are likely to 
face significant financial constraints due to relatively less developed capital markets and 
institutional/infrastructural bottlenecks. Our results show that managers of African firms save a higher 
proportion of their firms’ internally generated cash ﬂows, and when they decide to spend, they tend to 
prioritise dividend payments over investment in capital expenditure, debt repayments, and equity 
repurchases. The results also show that the allocations to investments (capital expenditure) are lower 
than to debt adjustments and only, rank higher than equity repurchases. This high propensity to save is 
consistent with our prediction of the existence of signiﬁcant ﬁnancing constraints in relatively 
underdeveloped African capital markets, and the need to hedge by hoarding more internal funds. 
Further, our results are in line with: (1) the use of dividends as a signalling tool for credit quality in 
environments of higher information asymmetry, and (2) the possible existence of underinvestment 
problems due to the high risk-aversion exhibited by managers of ﬁrms in Africa. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full sample 
Variables N Firms Mean SD Min p25 p75 Max 
CF 5,503 730 0.183 0.113 0.006 0.105 0.239 0.574 
∆CASH  5,503 730 0.014 0.077 -0.206 -0.023 0.045 0.293 
DIV  5,503 730 0.054 0.063 0.000 0.013 0.069 0.328 
CAPEX 5,503 730 0.083 0.069 0.000 0.034 0.112 0.355 
∆TDA 5,503 730 0.019 0.098 -0.304 -0.020 0.053 0.383 
∆E 5,503 730 0.003 0.031 -0.142 0.000 0.000 0.189 
MTBV 5,503 730 1.800 0.950 0.632 1.138 2.196 5.497 
SIZE 5,503 730 15.300 1.869 10.380 14.130 16.590 18.980 
TANG 5,503 730 0.356 0.209 0.018 0.184 0.517 0.818 
TDA 5,503 730 0.155 0.136 0.000 0.039 0.236 0.578 
CASH 5,503 730 0.125 0.107 0.002 0.046 0.172 0.514 
Panel B: Statistics by country 
Variables N Firms CF ∆CASH  DIV  CAPEX ∆TDA ∆E 
Botswana 21 5 0.162 0.025 0.044 0.097 0.015 0.018 
Cote D'ivoire 9 3 0.187 0.006 0.089 0.091 0.034 0.008 
Egypt 478 76 0.184 0.016 0.074 0.063 0.013 0.011 
Ghana 49 10 0.209 0.021 0.025 0.136 0.012 0.015 
Kenya 184 30 0.187 0.013 0.070 0.088 0.013 0.003 
Malawi 8 2 0.248 -0.010 0.029 0.163 0.060 -0.001 
Morocco 327 48 0.192 0.002 0.072 0.067 0.014 -0.001 
Nigeria 200 38 0.207 0.008 0.056 0.126 0.031 0.003 
South Africa 3,871 458 0.181 0.015 0.050 0.083 0.021 0.001 
Tanzania 22 4 0.284 0.027 0.110 0.124 0.005 -0.002 
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Tunisia 287 45 0.156 0.012 0.052 0.077 0.010 0.009 
Uganda 10 2 0.140 -0.009 0.014 0.081 0.005 0.000 
Zambia 37 9 0.189 0.003 0.023 0.135 0.002 0.000 
Total 5,503 730 0.183 0.014 0.054 0.083 0.019 0.003 
The statistics in the table are based on a sample consisting of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms from 13 African countries over the period 
from 2000 to 2015. The variables are cash-ﬂow (CF), change in cash (∆CASH), dividend (DIV), investments in capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), change in debt (∆TDA), change in equity (∆E), market-to-book ratio (MTBV), ﬁrm size (SIZE), asset 
tangibility (TANG), debt ratio (TDA), and cash balance (CASH). All the variables are deﬁned in the Appendix. 
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Table 2: Time series statistics and correlation matrix 
Panel A: Statistics by year 
Year All Countries 
South 
Africa 
Others CF ∆CASH  DIV  CAPEX ∆TDA ∆E MTBV SIZE TANG TDA 
2000 153 149 4 0.178 0.011 0.031 0.082 0.027 -0.006 1.390 15.440 0.363 0.159 
2001 208 201 7 0.221 0.043 0.044 0.083 0.016 0.003 1.484 15.410 0.328 0.150 
2002 235 226 9 0.177 0.02 0.043 0.077 0.01 0.000 1.399 15.400 0.332 0.138 
2003 292 281 11 0.179 0.007 0.042 0.081 0.011 -0.001 1.350 15.550 0.368 0.152 
2004 306 285 21 0.186 0.026 0.042 0.085 0.002 0.002 1.560 15.630 0.349 0.141 
2005 371 286 85 0.19 0.011 0.053 0.084 0.006 -0.001 1.882 15.350 0.334 0.134 
2006 407 284 123 0.206 0.017 0.064 0.09 0.024 0.000 2.215 15.360 0.331 0.140 
2007 444 285 159 0.21 0.024 0.062 0.095 0.028 0.001 2.237 15.170 0.336 0.155 
2008 459 293 166 0.2 0.004 0.064 0.098 0.048 0.004 1.758 15.270 0.336 0.171 
2009 454 276 178 0.173 0.011 0.057 0.088 0.013 0.003 1.637 15.200 0.364 0.167 
2010 453 274 179 0.165 0.014 0.052 0.075 -0.005 0.004 1.779 15.230 0.379 0.150 
2011 439 262 177 0.167 0.006 0.058 0.08 0.014 0.004 1.787 15.310 0.395 0.149 
2012 384 215 169 0.167 0.013 0.057 0.077 0.024 0.004 1.888 15.180 0.374 0.148 
2013 362 214 148 0.167 0.009 0.055 0.074 0.031 0.003 1.913 15.100 0.365 0.169 
2014 318 193 125 0.173 0.003 0.058 0.074 0.026 0.006 1.932 15.120 0.367 0.175 
2015 218 147 71 0.16 0.019 0.049 0.066 0.027 0.009 1.924 15.370 0.345 0.187 
Total 5503 3871 1632 0.183 0.014 0.054 0.083 0.019 0.003 1.800 15.300 0.356 0.155 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
No. Variables   CF ∆CASH  DIV  CAPEX ∆TDA ∆E MTBV SIZE TANG TDA CASH 
1 CF  1.000           
2 ∆CASH   0.346*** 1.000          
3 DIV   0.511*** -0.004 1.000         
4 CAPEX  0.401*** -0.021 0.121*** 1.000        
5 ∆TDA  0.251*** 0.067*** 0.057*** 0.310*** 1.000       
6 ∆E  0.086*** 0.136*** 0.042** 0.076*** 0.083*** 1.000      
7 MTBV  0.415*** 0.010 0.585*** 0.147*** 0.009 0.040** 1.000     
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8 SIZE  0.094*** -0.013 0.070*** 0.203*** 0.107*** -0.018 0.059*** 1.000    
9 TANG  0.122*** -0.121*** 0.044*** 0.462*** 0.021 0.058*** -0.007 0.235*** 1.000   
10 TDA  -0.030* -0.074*** -0.255*** 0.130*** 0.369*** 0.023 -0.203*** 0.167*** 0.252*** 1.000  
11 
CASH 
  0.207*** 0.402*** 0.221*** -0.182*** -0.120*** 0.014 0.154*** 
-
0.209*** 
-
0.320*** 
-
0.369*** 1.000 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics while Panel B presents the correlations among the study’s variables. The sample consists of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in Africa over the period 2000 to 
2015. All variables used are deﬁned in the Appendix. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Regression analysis of the cash ﬂow uses in Africa 
Model OLS   GMM 
Variables 
∆CASH DIV CAPEX ∆TDA ∆EQUITY   ∆CASH DIV CAPEX ∆TDA ∆EQUITY 
CFit 0.285*** 0.167*** 0.139*** 0.146*** -0.008*  0.278*** 0.188*** 0.089*** 0.117*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.004)  (0.025) (0.022) (0.017) (0.026) (0.004) 
Yit−1       -0.021 0.360*** 0.529*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 
 
      (0.023) (0.044) (0.024) (0.020) (0.017) 
MTBVit−1 -0.012*** 0.027*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.001**  -0.016*** 0.016*** 0.001 0.006** 0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) 
SIZEit−1 -0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.003** -0.001*  -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.001*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
TANGit−1 -0.027*** 0.004 0.120*** -0.013 0.002  0.003 -0.009 0.034*** 0.006 0.005 
 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.002)  (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.003) 
TDAit−1 -0.044*** -0.086*** 0.001 -0.017 0.004  -0.067*** -0.036*** -0.008 -0.116*** 0.001 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.003)  (0.023) (0.012) (0.015) (0.031) (0.003) 
CASHit−1 -0.148*** 0.082*** -0.002 -0.067*** 0.002  -0.200*** 0.074*** 0.031** -0.173*** 0.001 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.004)  (0.029) (0.015) (0.015) (0.029) (0.004) 
Constant 0.129*** -0.082*** -0.008 -0.016 0.036***  0.039* -0.029* 0.005 -0.041 0.025*** 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.039) (0.029) (0.014)   (0.024) (0.015) (0.017) (0.041) (0.008) 
N 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773  3,277 3,277 3,277 3,277 3,277 
R^2 0.192 0.512 0.331 0.078 0.051       
m2       1.378 -0.0868 0.289 -1.207 0.0652 
p-value       0.168 0.931 0.773 0.227 0.948 
J       370.8 341.8 351.0 372.1 355.2 
p-value             0.993 1.000 0.999 0.992 0.999 
The results in the table are based on a sample of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms from 13 African countries during 2000 to 2015. The variables are cash ﬂow (CF), change in cash (∆CASH), dividend 
(DIV), investments in capital expenditure (CAPEX), change in debt (∆TDA), change in equity (∆E), market-to-book ratio (MTBV), ﬁrm size (SIZE), asset tangibility (TANG), debt ratio 
(TDA), and cash balance (CASH). All the variables are deﬁned in the Appendix. All models include dummies to control for industry-, year-, and country-fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Robustness testing: Financial crisis and cash flow components tests 
Sample 2007-2009 financial crisis period   Non-financial crisis (normal) period   Cyclical & trend analysis 
Variables 
∆CASH DIV CAPEX ∆TDA ∆EQUITY   ∆CASH DIV CAPEX ∆TDA ∆EQUITY   ∆CASH DIV CAPEX ∆TDA ∆EQUITY 
CFit 0.330*** 0.151*** 0.115*** 0.107*** 0.001  0.268*** 0.166*** 0.143*** 0.156*** -0.012**       
 
(0.027) (0.021) (0.023) (0.034) (0.009)  (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.005)       
CF_cycleit             0.273*** 0.174*** 0.045* 0.077*** -0.008* 
 
            (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.005) 
CF_trendit             0.315*** 0.158*** 0.117*** 0.100*** -0.001 
 
            (0.023) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.004) 
MTBVit−1 -0.016*** 0.031*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.001  -0.012*** 0.028*** 0.004* -0.004** 0.001***  -0.017*** 0.036*** 0.005*** 0.003 -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) 
SIZEit−1 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.004* -0.000  -0.002** 0.003*** 0.001 0.005*** -0.001**  0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.003* 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
TANGit−1 -0.026** -0.003 0.157*** -0.021 0.011**  -0.024*** 0.004 0.109*** -0.005 -0.002  -0.022*** 0.002 0.118*** 0.018 0.002 
 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.003)  (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) 
TDAit−1 -0.062*** -0.119*** 0.015 0.075** -0.014**  -0.041*** -0.071*** 0.000 -0.061*** 0.011***  -0.050*** -0.042*** -0.011 -0.035* 0.005** 
 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.031) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.018) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.002) 
CASHit−1 -0.144*** 0.064*** -0.008 -0.057* 0.003  -0.155*** 0.101*** -0.003 -0.093*** 0.001  -0.143*** 0.082*** -0.032* -0.087*** 0.004 
 
(0.032) (0.018) (0.020) (0.033) (0.009)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.005)  (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.003) 
Constant 0.154*** -0.080*** -0.047 0.080* 0.004  0.129*** -0.091*** 0.005 -0.044 0.040***  0.035 -0.025 -0.015 -0.046 0.001 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.034) (0.047) (0.012)   (0.023) (0.020) (0.041) (0.031) (0.015)   (0.022) (0.025) (0.033) (0.029) (0.007) 
N 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196  3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577  3,085 3,085 3,085 3,085 3,085 
R^2 0.255 0.556 0.440 0.131 0.087   0.176 0.507 0.299 0.090 0.058   0.222 0.587 0.343 0.098 0.036 
The results in table are based on our primary sample from 2000 to 2015. All the variables are deﬁned in the Appendix. Financial crisis period is from 2007-2009, and all other periods refer to non-financial crisis period. CF_cycle and CF_trend 
refer to the cycle (transitory) and trend (permanent) components of our cash flow measure. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Robustness testing: Sampling and financial constraint issues 
Panel A: Sampling issues 
Sample South Africa   Other African countries   Full sample including financial & utility firms 
Variables ∆CASH DIV CAPEX ∆TDA ∆EQUITY   ∆CASH DIV CAPEX ∆TDA ∆EQUITY   ∆CASH DIV CAPEX ∆TDA ∆EQUITY 
CFit 0.272*** 0.152*** 0.105*** 0.148*** -0.008*  0.333*** 0.161*** 0.186*** 0.108*** -0.001  0.269*** 0.159*** 0.127*** 0.144*** -0.012*** 
 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.014) (0.021) (0.004)  (0.029) (0.022) (0.024) (0.032) (0.009)  (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.004) 
MTBVit−1 -0.014*** 0.037*** 0.008*** 0.002 0.001  -0.009*** 0.015*** 0.003 -0.001 0.002**  -0.010*** 0.026*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.002*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
SIZEit−1 -0.002** 0.002* -0.001 0.003** -0.000  -0.004*** 0.006*** 0.002 0.003 -0.001*  -0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002 0.003** -0.001*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
TANGit−1 -0.031*** 0.006 0.136*** 0.006 -0.001  -0.017 0.002 0.074*** -0.051** 0.003  -0.027*** 0.005 0.115*** -0.011 0.003 
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.003)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) 
TDAit−1 -0.050*** -0.066*** -0.005 -0.052*** 0.007**  -0.025** -0.115*** 0.016 0.003 -0.002  -0.047*** -0.084*** 0.000 -0.013 0.005 
 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.018) (0.003)  (0.012) (0.015) (0.024) (0.027) (0.005)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.003) 
CASHit−1 -0.172*** 0.058*** 0.013 -0.038** 0.009*  -0.109*** 0.142*** -0.019 -0.112*** -0.016*  -0.152*** 0.076*** 0.001 -0.065*** -0.001 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.005)  (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.009)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.004) 
Constant 0.083*** -0.083*** 0.026 -0.037 0.027***  0.110*** -0.114*** -0.038 -0.034 0.040**  0.159*** -0.096*** -0.021 -0.018 0.052*** 
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.026) (0.008)   (0.026) (0.030) (0.049) (0.046) (0.015)   (0.026) (0.020) (0.035) (0.027) (0.014) 
N 3,413 3,413 3,413 3,413 3,413  1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360  4,966 4,966 4,966 4,966 4,966 
R^2 0.182 0.517 0.372 0.136 0.026   0.262 0.575 0.338 0.060 0.110   0.189 0.499 0.326 0.079 0.064 
Panel B: Financial constraint tests 
Proxy Asset tangibility   Asset liquidity   Wu & Whited (WW) index 
Variables ∆CASH DIV CAPEX ∆TDA ∆EQUITY   ∆CASH DIV CAPEX ∆TDA ∆EQUITY   ∆CASH DIV CAPEX ∆TDA ∆EQUITY 
Constrained 
0.376*** 0.100*** 0.039*** 0.146*** -0.007  0.216*** 0.228*** 0.107*** 0.188*** -0.016**  0.347*** 0.094*** 0.115*** 0.160*** -0.004 
(0.027) (0.021) (0.011) (0.031) (0.007)  (0.025) (0.021) (0.016) (0.033) (0.007)  (0.029) (0.019) (0.020) (0.030) (0.008) 
Unconstrained 
0.227*** 0.181*** 0.167*** 0.112*** -0.011  0.369*** 0.130*** 0.170*** 0.154*** 0.003  0.178*** 0.208*** 0.134*** 0.090*** -0.016** 
(0.027) (0.019) (0.027) (0.030) (0.008)   (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) (0.033) (0.007)   (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.032) (0.007) 
The results in table are based on our primary sample from 2000 to 2015. All the variables are deﬁned in the Appendix. All regressions in Panel B based on the baseline model and include the standard controls but are unreported to conserve 
space. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix: Variable deﬁnitions 
Variable Acronyms Deﬁnition 
Capital expenditure CAPEX Capital expenditure (DWCX) scaled by lagged total assets (WC02999). 
Dividend pay-out DIV Dividends (WC18192) scaled by lagged total assets (WC02999). 
Cash CASH Cash and cash equivalent (WC02005) divided by total assets (WC02999). 
Cash ﬂow  CF Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA) (WC18198) less changes in working capital 
(excluding cash) scaled by lagged total assets (WC02999). 
Working capital WC Current Assets (WC02201) less Current Liabilities (WC02005) scaled by total assets (WC02999). 
∆EQUITY ∆E Changes in total liabilities & shareholders’ equity (WC03255) less changes in total liabilities (WC03351) scaled by 
lagged total assets (WC02999). 
Total debt   TDA Total debt (WC03255) scaled by total assets (WC02999). 
∆Total debt   ∆TDA Changes in total debt (WC03255) scaled by lagged total assets (WC02999). 
Market to book value MTBV Market capitalisation (WC08001) plus total liabilities (WC03351), scaled by total assets (WC02999). 
Tangible assets  TANG Fixed assets (W02501) scaled by total assets (WC02999). 
Firm size  SIZE The logarithm of total assets (WC02999) in 2000 prices. 
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Notes: 
1Similarly, Ravid and Sarig (1991) and Ross (1977) report that the signalling role of dividends (on the credit quality of the ﬁrm) signiﬁcantly increases with information 
asymmetry. 
2Several studies in the US largely focus on ICFS, while overlooking the other uses of cash ﬂows (e.g. Chen and Chen, 2012; Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). 
These studies regard a stronger (weaker) investment-cash ﬂow-sensitivity to be indicative the presence (absence) of ﬁnancial constraint. However, the empirical evidence is 
mixed leading to debates on whether or not ICFS is a good measure of ﬁnancial constraints (see Chen and Chen, 2012). In the African context, even studies on ICFS and cash 
flow sensitivity of cash are rare. There are, however, some studies on the determinants of corporate cash holdings in Africa (see e.g. Yensu, 2014). In addition to the cash 
holdings, Yensu (2014) explores the determinants of dividend policy and capital structure of African firms. Our article differs from the work of Yensu (2014) in that we focus 
on how current cash flow contributes towards investments, dividend payments, debt repayments, equity repurchases, and savings.  
3Due to data limitations on African firms, we were unable to include investments such as acquisitions and intangibles in our analysis. This implies that we are unable to 
provide a complete account of firms spend their cash flow, and thereby, the cash flow identity may not strictly hold in our analysis. It is important to highlight that due to the 
use of imperfect proxies, the cash flow identity does not always hold even in studies on the advanced economies (see e.g. Table 3 of Lewellen and Lewellen, 2016). These 
concerns limit our study and the findings should be interpreted with caution. 
4We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach which helps us to preserve our sample size to cover more African countries (13 instead of 5).   
5Firms in the financial and utilities industries are often excluded because the heavy regulation of those industries makes their firms completely heterogeneous from other 
firms. For instance, banks borrow from other banks and/or the Central Bank on completely different terms and are subject to minimum cash holding requirements (i.e. reserve 
ratio). In fact, when we include these special firms in our analysis, our firm-year observations increase marginally by 193 (from 5,503 to 5,696), and our conclusions 
remained robust. We, however, decided to follow standard practice by dropping these firms to aid comparison of our findings with prior studies.     
6The requirement for 5 consecutive years of data helps to generate the required lags and instruments for the lagged dependent variable. In particular, introducing a lag calls 
for at least 2 consecutive years of data while instrumenting the lagged dependent variable with its differenced variable requires an additional year of data (3 years in total). 
Meanwhile, sometimes when the moment conditions are not met and instruments fail the validity tests (e.g. Hansen tests) or when using higher moment conditions to 
minimize measurement error concerns, deeper lags such as the fourth and fifth may be required.  
                                                          
